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Abstract  
In this paper we argue that performance measurement can better be done by general, less accurate 
measurements than by complex – and possible more accurate - ones. The conclusions of this study 
are drawn from a case study of the Dutch Foundation for effective use of medication. While most 
studies about performance measurements focus on the management of public service organizations, 
this case study - informed by the literature from Science and Technology Studies – focuses on the 
active role of the measurements themselves. Indicators, we show, do not have to be as complex as 
the practices they represent, as long as they are part of a chain of intermediary data that allow 
traveling from the general or simple indicators to detailed data in day-to-day practices and vice 
versa. Furthermore, general indicators enable stakeholders to take distance from each other. Rather 
than the involvement of stakeholders, it is this reflexive distancing that explains the degree of 
compliance to performance measurement and thereby the prospect for effective co-governance.
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UNEXPECTED ADVANTAGES OF LESS ACCURATE PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENTS. HOW SIMPLE PRESCRIPTION DATA CONTROL THE USE OF 
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INTRODUCTION 
Performance measurement in the public sector is a contested area. The goal of measurement is 
unclear as indicators are linked to many functions, such as creating transparency, learning, appraisal 
and sanctioning (Radin 2006). Performance indicators give a poor representation of the complexity, 
variety and dynamics of public service production and can create more perverse than beneficial 
effects. Because it is hard to define performance of professional work, performance measurement 
systems tend to grow into complex systems (Power 1997; De Bruijn, 2002; Jos 2004; Dubnick, 
2005; Radin 2006; Sanderson 2006). Improved representation is not automatically the best answer 
to these problems. There is more at stake than realizing an approximation of reality, such as 
competing values and professional accountability. Paradoxically, the limited representation of the 
complexities of public services seemed to be a strong point of the particular measurement (Klein 
and Carter 1988; Radin 2006; De Bruijn 2002). Many students of performance measurement have 
already contributed to the challenge of unraveling this enigma. Here are some answers: 
- The majority of performance indicators function as tin-openers rather than dials (Klein and 
Carter 1988). “By opening up a „can of worms‟ they do not give answers but prompt 
interrogation and inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate picture” 
(Carter 1994: 213). This creates the possibility of clarifying that a movement in a particular 
direction, such as towards lower unit costs or reduced length of patient stay, is desirable 
without setting a specific target or precise standard. Performance measurement provides no 
answers, but inspires actors to ask the right questions (Van Peursem et al 1995). 
- Every single performance indicator should be interpreted as a poor representation of 
performance. If we acknowledge that a public performance can never be identified by one 
indicator, we need to allow more variety in performance measurement (Lindgren 2001; 
Radin 2006; De Bruijn 2002; Kanter and Summers 1987, Noordegraaf and Abma 2007). The 
poor quality of a single indicator is a drive to tolerate variety in the system of performance 
measurement or to develop a repertoire of performance measures. Variety and redundancy 
have a number of advantages, such as moderating incentives for perverting behavior and 
dealing with, in stead of destroying it, the ambiguous picture of performance measurement 
(Bevan and Hood 2006; De Bruijn 2002). When public performance is multiple, the 
measurement of this performance should also be multiple. 
- Performance measurement is a game, which implies that every performance indicator has a 
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limited life. Performance measurement will cease to be effective after some time, because 
professionals learn to play with it or the beneficial effects of performance measurement are 
realized or worked out (De Bruijn 2002). This dynamics of performance measurement 
maximizes, rather than minimizes, the perverse effects. Challenging the involved actors 
requires a lively and dynamic system of performance measurement. Bevan and Hood (2004) 
advised a game-proof design by introducing more uncertainty into the specifications of 
targets by making them transparent in process and in retrospect but not in real time. 
- Performance measurement is basically an issue of trust and interaction (De Bruijn 2002; 
Noordegraaf and Abma 2007). Interaction can improve the confidence stakeholders have in 
each other and in the system of performance measurement. Measurements should be 
reasonable, i.e. connected to the goals of the various actors involved (Radin 2006; De Bruijn 
2002).  Both managers and professionals must agree upon the reasons, evidence and 
rationales that are relevant. De Bruijn suggests to set up rules how to use performance 
measurements that make stakeholders use the measurements in a predictable way and 
mitigate its impact (De Bruijn 2002) 
What these answers have in common is that good performance measurement seems to find a 
balance between recognizing the complexity of public services without becoming as complex as the 
practices they represent. We found various contributory factors in literature that can explain why the 
limited representation is a strong point of the particular measurement, such as performance 
indicators can be used as tin-openers and give reason for more interaction, necessitate the 
development of multiple indicators and stimulate a lively practice of measurement. In this article we 
also want to contribute to the design of performance indicators that takes into account the 
complexity without becoming complex themselves. Our contribution to the debate would be to add 
another relevant alternative definition of „validity‟, which acknowledges more radically that 
accuracy is not the main issue. In this paper we open the black box of a performance indicator. A 
performance indicator, we show, is much more differentiated and an active entity. Reduction is a 
step by step process starting at complexity and ending in one indicator. An active concept of validity 
and representation, developed in de field of Science and Technology Studies, can show in a new 
way how measurements can keep its simplicity and still be effective in complex settings.  
The aim of our study is to understand how measurements can keep its simplicity and still be 
effective. We focus on a particular case, i.e. the use of prescription data by insurers to control the 
use of medicines in general practice. In the Netherlands insurers ask general practitioners to analyze 
prescription data in order to enhance the cost-effective and clinical effective use of medication. The 
prescription data in this particular case are rather general. It is just one measurement, i.e. the 
number of prescriptions of a certain drug per general practitioner. Also no corrections are made for 
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the particular population of patients of a general practitioner – or any other bias. The validity of 
prescription data as indicator for the cost-effective and clinical effective use of medication was a 
problem at first, but after the singularization of the sources from which the data was retrieved to one 
source, the accuracy of the data was hardly discussed any more. Note, the measurement itself was 
not changed; only the number of sources from which the data was retrieved was limited to one, 
namely the national database of pharmacists.  Also no additional measures were developed. Neither 
have stakeholders been involved in the development of the measurement. How could simple or 
general measurements, with all its limitations, work? 
Our analysis focuses upon the construction and use of prescription data. Thereby we are 
especially interested in the role of measurements as intermediaries between the complexities of 
clinical work and more simple performance goals. Given the complexity of pharmaceutical care, the 
question whether physicians prescribe drugs rationally (both clinically effective and cost-effective) 
cannot easily be answered by an inspection of their work. At the very least, an inspection of their 
work would produce seemingly inconclusive evidence. The question can only be settled through a 
formal inquiry which accurately but selectively represents clinical practice in such a way that 
specific relationships become visible while others, of course, remains hidden (see Latour 1987). The 
relationships specific to the medical practice re-presented by the numbers would otherwise remain 
hidden in the innumerable relationships that make up medical work. In this respect, measurements 
are inherently simple. Yet, measurements can coordinate activities and events at various locations 
and times without the need to bring all these elements together in one total measurement. In other 
words, measurements can link general and aggregated data with individual decisions and actions in 
day-to-day practice (Latour 1987).  
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we explain our theoretical perspective of 
measurements. Next, we analyze practices of prescription measurement in Dutch primary care. 
Thereby we focus upon the networks of measurements linking those exercising political power with 
the persons, processes and problems that they seek to govern (Rose 1999). In the last section, we 
present our conclusions where we reflect upon the contribution of our study to the performance 
measurement debate.  
 
THE ACTIVE ROLE OF MEASUREMENT IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Our approach is informed by the literature from science and technology studies (STS) and related 
fields of study (Latour 1987; Rose 1999; Callon 2001; Mackenzie 2003; Poster 2004; Mackenzie 
2007).  As Rose (1999) has explicated, measurements achieve political power. Measurements, for 
example, legitimize the power authorities or institutions claim. Numbers also transform individuals 
into percentages and thereby invisibly align private values with public goals. Last but not least, 
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measurements construct the public domain – “the domain of politics is numerically made” (Rose 
1999: 198). How can we explain this active role of measurement in politics and public 
management? 
Performance measurement is one aspect of a network consisting of many relationships. 
Measuring performance takes only some of these relationships into account in the calculations; 
others (the majority) are excluded (Callon 2003). Measuring performance means disentangling and 
dissociating the actors involved from their daily complexity (Callon 2003). The main quality of a 
measurement, according to Latour, is not to be objective or representative, but to be presentable –
that is, to present absent objects or people to those that one needs to convince (Latour 1995). The 
development of a registry requires things or events to be inscribed in standardized forms and the 
inscriptions to be transported to a central locale, where they can be compiled, aggregated, compared 
and calculated. Yet, essential to measurements, however, is that they be traceable, that they allow 
one to travel from the complex field down towards individual graphs or measurements and from the 
measurements back to the entire field. Therefore, general or „simple‟ measurements can control 
complex performances but only if they allow one to travel from detailed data to a more general 
indicator, and, more importantly, vice versa. 
In the selection of what to measure and how to measure it implicit political judgments are 
made. In this paper we study the development of measurement as a layering of values: what is 
counted becomes normalized and what is not counted remains invisible (for a similar argument see 
Radin, 2006). This normativity of administration and other formal systems has been debated 
extensively in STS (Radder, 1998, Thevenot and Boltanksi, 2006). A distinctive insight of STS 
studies is that measurement systems constitute or create the world they appear to represent; 
numbers do not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality in a database (MacKenzie, 2006; Rose, 1999). 
Performance measurements do not simply count elements in a pre-existing world, but help to create 
a world for which the measurement is a truer reflection (MacKenzie 2003). An illustration of this 
active role of measurement is given by MacKenzie (2003; 2007), who describes how the Black-
Scholes-Merton theory has become the dominant theory for calculating the expected price of 
options in financial markets although the fit between the model and the prices of options on the 
market was not always close. According to Mackenzie, the success of the Black-Scholes-Merton 
theory – in terms of its use – cannot be explained either by the validity of the model or by the 
accuracy of the data, but by the model‟s data sheets that help traders solve a variety of operational 
and organizational problems. The sheets were beautifully designed for their intended role of 
distributing relevant information and prices based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model. They 
included “what options traders using the Black-Scholes-Merton model needed to know, but no more 
than they needed to know – there is virtually no redundant information on a sheet – hence their easy 
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portability” (MacKenzie 2007: 62). As the sheets were used by almost every trader, because they 
helped them deal with several day-to-day problems in a relatively easy way, the financial markets 
began behaving more and more according to the assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model. 
In other words, the fit between the model and the prices of options was not the starting point for the 
use of the model, but the end result. 
We show in this paper that there is a constitutive relationship between specific forms of 
measurement and modern practices of self-governance. This idea is inspired by Foucault‟s work on 
„governmentality‟, where to govern human beings is to presuppose the freedom of the governed. 
Foucault explains how „techniques of the self‟ respect the autonomy of the citizen yet mould them 
in such a way that their behavior is suitable for specific views about collective and individual 
welfare (Foucault 1988). Similarly, Rose (1999) warns us that we should not think of measurement 
systems purely as technologies of domination, for they can also be technologies of autonomization 
and responsibilization. Rose argues that numbers and measurement systems have a role in 
subjectification – “they turn the individual into a calculating self endowed with a range of ways of 
thinking about, calculating about, predicting and judging their own activities and those of others” 
(Rose 1999: 214). For instance, performance measurement systems create calculating selves, like 
workers trying to maximize their achievements in norms that could be calculated and embedded in 
the organization with the aid of the same measurement systems. People are enmeshed in these 
calculation networks both as objects and active participants. We analyse how a measurement system 
respects the autonomy of doctors and at the same time stimulates a practice of self-governance that 
fits in with the aims of political authorities. 
Once a network is in place, new conduits of power can be exercised over distant events and 
processes: the things or events that one measures can be moved (to be re-presented) to those one 
wants to convince. Only at the registry – the centre of calculation – are the inscriptions aggregated, 
compared, and compiled. As we will describe pharmacists and the insurers gained a prominent 
position since they aggregate, compare and compile the data, and bring the prescription data to the 
doctors they want to convince (see Latour 1987). However, measurements should allow one to 
travel back from the measurements (the centre) towards the field (the periphery). Hence, neither 
insurers nor pharmacists can exercise power over the events and processes taking place in the clinic 
as the measurements allow only the doctors to travel from the general data down to the day-to-day 
decisions about prescriptions, and vice versa.  
 
METHODS 
Our study is designed as a case study with a particular attention to the context, rather than a certain 
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policy plan or intervention. The primary unit of analysis is a situation (see Clarke 2005). The 
situation we analyze is the way local pharmaceutical consultation groups (in Dutch farmaco-
therapeutisch overleg, abbreviated as FTO groups) use prescription data to enhance the clinical and 
cost effectiveness of the use of drugs on behalf of Dutch Insurers, which are increasingly 
responsible for the rational use of drugs in primary care since the introduction of regulated 
competition in the Netherlands. In this study we combine analysis of dominant discourses and 
organizational settings with detailed study of the tools general practitioners and pharmacists use to 
retrieve, analyze and present prescription data.  Our analysis of this case focuses on the 
infrastructure developed to produce and compare prescription data. In particular, we deconstruct the 
series of intermediaries (tables, datasets, and forms) that make prescription data into a performance 
measurement. This series of intermediaries, we show, explain how general and aggregated data are 
linked with individual decisions in day-to-day practice - the chain of data allows the traveling from 
indicators to detailed data in day-to-day practice and vice versa. We would like to stress that non 
human elements, like databases and forms, might condition the interactions, just like human actors 
do. Non human agents can channel the flow of regulation more effectively than the representative 
actors can speak for them (see also the former section). These material infrastructures as we will 
show, explain the transformation of the relationship between state-actors and public service 
workers, or between regulators and professionals.  
 
Our approach was developed in the context of two studies about the role of insurers in Dutch Health 
care that we conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Health and the Dutch Health Care Insurance 
Board. In 2004, for the Dutch Ministry of Health, we studied the new role of pharmacists as 
pharmaceutical care providers supposed to contribute to a more rational use of medicines (Niezen 
2005). We conducted in-depth interviews with 11 key respondents, including the general manager 
of the database for pharmaceutical statistics, an IT expert from the Royal Dutch Association for the 
Advancement of Pharmacy (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij ter bevordering der Pharmacie, 
KNMP) who was responsible for the development of web-based tools to analyze prescription data, 
and representatives from the Royal Dutch Medical Association (Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst, KNMG) who discussed the role of pharmacists with 
us. Additionally, we carried out an extensive document study. In this study, just like the study we 
present in the next paragraph, the ministry of health had a strong say in how the problem of study 
was framed.  
The second evaluation study was conducted in 2006. On behalf of the Dutch Healthcare 
Insurance Board (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, CVZ), we evaluated the possibilities for 
insurance companies to enhance the rational use of drugs by involving local pharmacotherapy 
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consultation groups of physicians and pharmacists in their policy measures (De Bont and Grit 
2007). We conducted interviews with physicians and pharmacists (n=10) who were involved in 
projects sponsored by insurers to improve the pharmaceutical consultation meetings. Besides the 
interviews we conducted an extensive document study of recognized „best practice‟ projects 
conducted by the consultation groups. As such, these projects were well described in professional 
journals. We also formally evaluated three of the projects. 
These studies resulted in a self-organized network in which we could collaborate with policy 
makers, physicians, pharmacists and insurers towards understanding the use of prescription data. In 
this informal and self organized network we shared information through story telling searching for 
useful concepts. This network was of crucial importance for the richness of the data (Wrede 2005). 
Thanks to this network our study draws on the socially situated and distributed expertise about 
policy and practice (Jasanoff 2007). 
Our analysis of the data is theoretical informed by the framework we introduced in the 
former section section. Main focus points were the development of databases and performance 
indicators, the use of data infrastructures, the functioning of FTO groups, debates about prescription 
behavior, the role of the different actors and their relationships. For this paper we also re-analyzed 
the interview transcripts and documents of the former two studies.  
 
  
 
MEASURING AND CONTROLING PRESCRIPTIONS IN PRIMARY CARE IN THE 
DUTCH CONTEXT 
The Dutch Health Insurance Act came into effect on 1 January 2006. The new act integrates social 
(sickness benefit funds) and private health insurance for curative care. It requires all Dutch health 
insurers to operate under private law and obliges all Dutch citizens to buy individual health 
insurance coverage (Van der Ven and Schut 2008). The new system is aimed at increasing efficiency 
and responsiveness through enhancement of health insurers' competences (selective contracting) 
and the introduction of more competition among health insurers. Consumers can chose among 
insurers,
 
and insurers can selectively contract healthcare providers. Although the introduction of this 
act was seen as an important marker for the start of the healthcare market in the Netherlands, 
market-oriented
 
healthcare reforms had already been underway for quite some time (Helderman et 
al. 2005). In 1988 advocates of a new market-oriented program began seriously challenging the 
existing policy programs. Top-down rationing policies were subjected
 
to growing criticism because 
of the lack of incentives
 
for efficiency improvements and innovations to the whole healthcare 
system. However, the necessary technical and
 
institutional preconditions for regulated competition 
 9 
were not yet in place (Helderman et al. 2005; Van der Ven and Schut 2008).  
With the gradual evolution of the Dutch healthcare system into regulated competition, 
insurers have become gradually an important sponsor of the healthcare system. Insurers
 
gained 
more freedom to negotiate on price, service, and quality of care. The insurers‟ new role began in the 
domain of pharmaceutical care (VWS 2000). For instance, insurers must specify the
 
contractual 
rights for the pharmaceuticals covered by their policies. Yet they are allowed to contract providers 
selectively and motivate consumers to use preferred providers or preferred drugs, for example, by 
providing financial
 
incentives. Some large
 
insurers are experimenting with some form of bonuses 
for prescribing generics. Others have begun setting up primary healthcare centers and pharmacies 
(Van der Ven and Schut 2008).  
Dutch general practitioners (GPs) and pharmacists are organized in local pharmaceutical 
consultation groups (FTO groups). The FTOs started off in a city or region as small groups of GPs 
with one or two local pharmacists who informed each other about (new) pharmaceuticals (Paes and 
Cornips 1987; Jansen 2004). In the 1990s, the Ministry of Health began supporting the development 
of a more formal system of FTO groups, to stimulate a more rational use of drugs. The Minister of 
Health introduced a price-reference system but realized that the desired efficiency improvement 
would not be obtained by top-down measurement. The ministry then expected the FTOs to fill a 
crucial role in developing a more effective system of self-governance. Besides gathering and 
reviewing information about pharmaceuticals, these consultation groups would have to discuss the 
prescription behavior of individual GPs and pharmacists. Nowadays, there is a nation-wide web of 
800 pharmaceutical consultation groups, including 90% of all GPs and pharmacists (DGV 2007). 
The work of these FTOs is closely monitored. Every year, the frequency of meetings, the 
availability of prescription data at meetings, the minutes and reports, and local prescription 
guidelines are measured. If an FTO meets at least four times a year, with 75% of its members 
present, and minutes are made of each meeting, most insurance companies reward the doctors in the 
group with an annual bonus of Euro 1500. Since 1999, the insurance companies have been 
encouraging FTOs to analyze prescription data. They ask the FTOs to set targets for drugs, to 
measure how often they prescribed a particular drug and deliver information on the numbers of 
patients receiving the drug prescribed. For instance, most insurers expect that for 80% of all new 
patients, GPs will prescribe the preferred drugs chosen by their consultation group. As this example 
shows political judgments are implicit in the measurements. Additionally, the measurements do not 
merely inscribe elements in a pre-existing world, but, as we will show later, helped to create a world 
that behave more and more according to the numbers.  
 
Pharmacists play a major but far from transparent role in preparing FTO meetings and setting the 
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stage for target-setting in order to enhance the rational use of drugs. In fact, the role of pharmacists 
in the Dutch healthcare system is heavily debated. Since 2001 the Ministry of Health has taken 
steps to expand the role of pharmacists (Pronk et al. 2002; Muijrers et al. 2004; IGZ 2003) from 
merely dispensing drugs to providing pharmaceutical care as well, including monitoring the rational 
use of drugs. The Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), however, is against expanding the 
role of pharmacists. GPs want pharmacists to stick to dispensing a prescribed drug and not interfere 
with the prescription since the GPs reason that if a pharmacist changed a prescription this would 
affect the confidential relationship between doctor and patient (Cohen 2001; NIVEL 2004; NIVEL 
2005; TNO 2005). The debate about the role of pharmacists has boiled down to the question 
whether a GP should add the patient‟s diagnosis to a prescription. Pharmacists claim they need the 
diagnosis to check and select the best drug. According to GPs, pharmacists do not need to know the 
diagnosis because in their view the pharmacist‟s only task is to dispense the prescribed drug. 
Nonetheless, it is pharmacists, not GPs, who deliver the data for the FTO groups. The data 
infrastructure has opened up the discussion of GPs‟ professional behavior – a discussion which, 
incidentally, pharmacists became welcome to join in. We claim that pharmacists can take on this 
role because the Royal Dutch Association for the Advancement of Pharmacy (KNMP) has created 
the infrastructure for pharmacists to retrieve and deliver the data in the preferred format. The 
KNMP first developed a national database with data from the community of pharmacists. A 
database for pharmaceutical statistics was, the KNMP believed, of strategic importance for the 
profession. Since 1990, the KNMP has been registering dispensation data through the Foundation 
for Pharmaceutical Statistics (Stichting Farmaceutische Kengetallen, SFK). The data includes the 
drug or medical aid supplied on prescription, the dispensing pharmacy, the health insurance 
company that does or does not reimburse the remedy, the prescribing doctor and the patient for 
whom the prescription was issued (www.sfk.nl). Since 2003, the KNMP has also developed 
software (SFK web tools) for individual pharmacists to retrieve and analyze the data stored in the 
SFK database. The KNMP developed the tools in collaboration with DGV, the Dutch Institute for 
Rational Use of Medicine (Metz et al, 2005). The tools include all the data and graphs a FTO group 
needs for a consultation meeting. The SFK uses these tools to automatically retrieve and analyze 
data for the pharmacist. Note: in contrast to GPs who receive a bonus of Euro 1500 basically for 
attending FTO meetings, pharmacists are not paid for the work of delivering the prescription data.  
It is possible to obtain similar data from GPs‟ medical records; however, this is a 
cumbersome retrieval method. First, the GPs have to find the data in their own records, perhaps 
using the prescription codes DGV has instructed them to use. DGV, however, assumes that GPs 
code their data with standard codes whereas the GPs might have good reason, as Winthereik et al 
(2007) have shown, to use other codes or even to record their data without codes. Second, the GPs 
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have to collate their separate data sets in one file in order to enable comparisons of data from the 
whole FTO group, a challenging task considering that GPs work in different places and with 
different systems. Last but not least, the data have to be analyzed and the statistics presented in 
hand-drawn graphs so that the group can actually discuss the findings.  
 Before the advent of SFK web tools, data were retrieved from various sources. GPs retrieved 
their own data from their electronic records and the pharmacists used the SFK.  As GPs in the 
various regions or cities worked with different systems and used different codes, it was not unusual 
for them to make their own datasets and, as a result several different GP datasets would be 
presented for discussion by the FTO groups – in addition to the data from the pharmacists. All these 
different datasets on the table led to discussions of validity since, for example, a GP‟s position in 
the rankings could differ from one dataset to another. In due course, the SFK data was used more 
often as it was much easier to retrieve than any other available dataset, which makes their 
measurements more presentable than others. Moreover, the pharmacists were keen to deliver it to 
demonstrate their proficiency in their role as pharmaceutical care providers. With the arrival of the 
SFK web tools, all data could be registered centrally and at last the measurements could meet the 
presentation requirements. Following the arrival of web-based tools, the SFK data became the only 
dataset used for prescription management. Having just one dataset stopped the discussions over data 
validity. In this respect, the web-based tools played an essential role in the creation of validity, not 
because the SFK data were any more accurate than the data from GPs‟ records, but because the SFK 
tools construct a world in which these data fit.  
 The prescription data GPs need to deliver to the insurers are relatively general. Basically 
they show only the number of patients per doctor who received a certain drug. This measurement of 
prescriptions may count patients but it excludes all other factors that can explain why a certain drug 
was prescribed, such as population characteristics (age, socioeconomic status, environment and 
lifestyle) and the role of other doctors. Measurement by one simple indicator ignores the complex 
nature of the performance of physicians and pharmacists. For example, a drug is an important link 
in the delicate network between GPs, specialists and patients. Changing a prescription might affect 
the GPs confidential relationship with both the specialist and patient. Therefore GPs are inclined to 
prolong prescriptions issued by specialists, even when they have to overrule their own guidelines to 
do so (NIVEL 2004; NIVEL 2005; TNO 2005). A drug is also a trump card in negotiations between 
patients and physicians. Dutch GPs often advise patients to take an aspirin as a painkiller. Patients, 
however, do not always regard aspirin as a serious outcome of a consult with the doctor because 
they already use it as self medication. In these cases, the GP might decide to prescribe something 
else which in the eyes of the patient is a „real‟ drug. Most of these relations are excluded. Hence, the 
patients who get certain drugs prescribed are turned into percentages, and with them the physicians 
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who prescribe the drugs. 
 However, the FTO groups succeeded in aligning simple indicator measurements with 
complex clinical practice, with the help of DGV and the SFK. DGV (2005) developed material that 
lets the GP trace an individual patient record and reconstruct the various rationales that made the GP 
decide to prescribe a drug. Figure 1 shows the tool that GPs use to track back from their total 
number of prescriptions down to the level of individual patients. For example, with this tool the GP 
can select the drug-prescription records that deviate from local guidelines, such as patients who use 
a drug longer than a certain time, or patients who are not prescribed the preferred drugs. Since these 
data are traceable, the GPs can recollect their decisions, and as they allow the GP to go back to the 
details of an individual patient, the simple measurements are precise enough. These simple 
indicators help GPs to critically reflect on their own and each other‟s practices and learn from one 
another, without destroying their individual autonomy. Even if GP behavior may not be determined 
by these performance indicators alone, these simple measurements do highlight inter-doctor 
variation, and the differences trigger discussion about the behavior of individual professionals. FTO 
groups are thus challenged to start a practice of self-governance. As Rose explicated numbers not 
only transform individuals in percentages but -thereby - also align private values with public goals, 
such as the rational use of drugs.  
 
[Insert figure 1 somewhere here] 
 
There is a constitutive relationship between general forms of measurement and systems of self-
monitoring and self-governance which in turn fits the goals of political authorities. Our analysis of 
the construction and use of general measurement explains how compliance with the goals of 
insurers is possible even though professionals distrust interventions by insurers. A crucial 
explanatory factor is that while the simple indicators enable the professionals to retrieve more 
detailed data, the data permit the insurers to break with complex practices. In this respect, simple 
measurements have an extra advantage; they set actors at a distance. Rather than technologies of 
domination, general prescription data act as technologies of autonomization. In our case only GPs 
are allowed full access to their patient records, thus no one else can take over their position (or 
decisions). The insurer has no access to the GPs‟ individual patient data. In this respect, multi-
dimensional measurement might actually hinder compliance with performance measurement 
because it would show more patient characteristics, such as diagnosis, age, sex and co-morbidity 
and shorten the distance between physicians and insurers. The notion of distance also explains why 
health insurance companies do not use their own data to control prescriptions. Insurers have always 
kept their own prescription data for the drugs they reimburse. In 1988 the Healthcare Insurance 
 13 
Board started up a database called GIP (Geneesmiddelen Informatie Project, medicine information 
project) to analyze these data. GIP contains expenditure information on (extramural) drugs and 
prescription-related data on drugs from nine health insurance organizations that have almost half of 
the Dutch population as their clients (7.5 million clients) (www.GIP.nl). In other words, instead of 
using their own resources, the insurers ask GPs to deliver the required data they already have for 
themselves. The insurers‟ behavior constructs a distance between themselves and the professionals 
that enables co-governance. Insurers, GPs and pharmacists maintain a distance between each other 
to be able to control performance together. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article is to contribute to the design of simple indicators that can take the 
complexity of professional work into account. As was explained in the introduction the 
effectiveness of performance indicators depends on its simplicity. Its simplicity not only makes 
performance measurement into a strong communication tool, it also prevents strategic behavior (De 
Bruijn 2007).  
 We started our analysis by describing the political context of measurements as the role they 
fulfill relies on relationships provided by political authority (Singh 2002, Tuohy 2003; Fox 2006;). 
As we showed in this paper, the roles of two central actors –i.e. the insurers and the pharmacists- 
were contested. As the Dutch Health Care Act came into effect in 2006, insurers were supposed to 
become the sponsors of the new health care market. Yet, insurers were hesitant to take a role in the 
health care governance of the quality of care. Pharmacists were contested for merely dispensing 
drugs, but were not allowed either to advance their roles as pharmaceutical care givers. What we 
show in this paper is how simple performance measurements created a new kind of political 
authority for both insurers and pharmacists that emanates from databases - which is not the same as 
legitimating and supporting the political authority of insurers, which is still contested as in the past. 
The political authority of measurement is not characterized by rule-following, since there are no 
strict rules for the GP to follow. Measurements create ranking among GPs, which generates 
discussions of behavior. Meanwhile, owing to their limitations, the simple, general indicators see to 
it that potential evaluators (e.g. insurers) are held at a sufficient distance. The prescription data 
function as what Foucault calls „techniques of the self‟ that respect the individual autonomy of GPs 
yet mould their behavior in such a way that it fits with the collective aim of a rational use of drugs. 
The degree of compliance to performance measurement and thereby the prospect for effective co-
governance can be explained by reflexive distancing, that is „general‟ indicators enable stakeholders 
to distance themselves from each other. 
Although the description of the political context is proven relevant, we are hesitant to include 
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formally institutionalized politics as an explanation of how performance measurements work. Such 
an explanation would separate politics from administration, while our ambition is to link the 
technical, practical and operational practices surrounding the construction of data to broader and 
more political questions about governance. As Gullick (1936) wrote, “The real work of government 
is not to be found behind the Greek columns on public buildings, but rather on the land, among the 
people” (cited in Rose, 1999). In our case study, how governance works is found in information 
technologies and systems, such as financial instruments, databases and calculations.  
To contribute to the work of Carter, De Bruijn, Radin and others, we introduced (active) 
concepts culled from science and technology studies to the analysis of the working and the 
dynamics of performance measurement. By analyzing the construction and use of general 
prescription data by pharmacists and GPs in the Netherlands, we were able to describe the 
advantages of a simple and general measurement to performance management in comparison to a 
more extensive set of performance indicators. First, simple performance measurement acts as a 
coordination mechanism between general (policy) goals and individual decisions or behavior in 
day-to-day practices. The „poor‟ quality of general prescription data was an invitation for GPs to go 
back to their patient records to get additional data. Once the statistical analyses were done, the files 
were not closed. On the contrary, sum totals were neither the outcome nor the end result of the 
ongoing process of making use of prescription data. Along with the prescription data, GPs were 
offered several tools to trace individual records and recall specific decisions the GP has made in the 
clinic. These tools allowed GPs to travel from graphic visualizations of sum totals down to the 
complex totality of their work, and back up to the simplicity of the indicator. As the tools allow the 
GPs to mediate between the simple indicators and the complexity of their work, simple indicators 
did not need to be replaced or enhanced by more complex sets of indicators. Consequently, the 
perverse effects of performance measurement kept minimized.  
Secondly, simple indicators put insurers at the ‘right’ distance. The involvement of stakeholders 
in the process of developing measurements is often seen a key condition for measuring 
performance, as it is one way of preventing measurements from becoming too distant from local 
practices. Yet, our findings indicate that it is this very distance between stakeholders that explains 
the degree of compliance that is achieved – not their proximity. As we explained in the theoretical 
section, with central registration new conduits of power can be exercised over distant events and 
processes because the input can be aggregated, compared, and compiled so that all the things or 
events that one measures can be re-presented to others. Yet the networks of measurement 
connecting those exercising political power with the processes, problems and persons they seek to 
govern, also provide the latter with power. As we showed in this article, both the prescription data 
and the tools that allow GPs – only GPs - to go back to the medical records reconstruct the 
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relationships between the insurers on the one hand and the GPs on the other hand. Essential to 
measurements, is that they allow one to travel from the complex totality of the field down to 
graphic visualizations of individual measurements, and back up to the entire field and in our case, 
only GPs can trace the measurements back and forth.  
Our research specifies two hypotheses for how simple performance indicators can function as 
successful tin-openers. First, effective performance measurement do not imply more indicators but 
to move backwards to where the performance started. i.e. back to the field. Second, auditing 
authorities should better not be involved in the opening of the „can of worms‟. They should reflect 
upon the right distance. We are very cautious to generalize these claims to other settings or 
countries, since performance measurement is always embedded in a specific setting. Yet we hoped 
to offer a framework for further research that is needed to test these hypotheses. 
.  
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Patient‟s 
name, sex, 
date of birth 
Dispensing 
pharmacist 
[name] 
Drug used 
[name] 
Indication according 
to protocol to reduce 
the use of the drug 
GP‟s assessment:  Is it 
possible to reduce the 
patient‟s use of the drug? 
Action to be 
taken 
Consult 
date  
Consult 
result  
Result 
after three 
months 
    0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
   
    0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
   
    0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
0 Yes 
0 Perhaps 
0 No 
   
 
Figure 1: A table that Dutch GPs use to trace their prescription behavior down to the level of individual patients. Source: DGV, the Institute for 
Rational Use of Medicines. 
